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INTERNATIONAL LAw-SELF-EXEcUTING TREATIBS-THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION-The crime of genocide is committed when a
person is harmed because of his nationality, race or religion.1 Because
of the number of offenses committed with genocidal motives during
and before the last war,2 and the shortcomings of the customary international law rules on the subject,3 the General Assembly of the United
1 See, in general, LEMKIN, Axis RULE IN OccuPIED EtmoPE (1944); JEssUP, A MoDERN
LAW OF NATIONS 183-184 (1949). Lemkin, "Genocide as a Crime Under International
Law," 41 AM. J. !NJ:. L. 145 (1947). For historical aspects, see Radin, "International
Crimes," 32 lowA L. REv. 33 (1946).
2 See JEWISH BLACK BooK CoMMI'ITEE, THE BLACK BooK (1946).
3 During the Nuremberg Trials, the International Military Tribunal decided, in ·effect,
that only mass extermination carried on during the war was punishable. See OFFICE OF nm
UNITED STATES CmEF COUNSEL FOR PROSECUTION oF Axis CRIMINALITY, NAZI CoNsPmACY AND AGGRESSION (Opinion and Judgment of the International Military Tribunal) 84

(1947).
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Nations unanimously adopted a Convention on Genocide, which has
been submitted for ratification by the members, including the United
States.4
The Genocide Convention has been attacked in several recent
articles appearing in the American Bar Association Journal.5 The core
of the criticism concerns the domestic effect of treaties. The principal
arguments advanced by opponents of the Convention can be placed
in syllogistic form: (I) The Convention is a self-executing type of
treaty, and would become automatically effective as supreme law of
the United States. 6 (2) Other signatory powers would have to take
supplemental action before the Convention would apply as their internal law. (3) Therefore, the United States, because of its "unique"
constitutional standard,7 would be at a comparative disadvantage in
signing the Convention. Since the logic of these objections will also
be deemed applicable to the Human Rights Covenant8 when it evolves
into treaty form, an examination of the qualities which mark a treaty
as self-executing seems timely.

A Tests for Determining the Status of a Treaty Provision as
Domestic Law

As Chief Justice Marshall has said, a treaty is the law of the land
and "equivalent to an act of the legislature, whenever it operates of
itself without the aid of any legislative provision. But when the terms
of the stipulation import a contract-when either of the parties engages
to perform a particular act, the treaty addresses itself to the political,
not the judicial department; and the legislature must execute the
contract before it can become a rule for the court."0 It is generally
agreed that a treaty is self-executing when no legislation is required
4

Jmm.

OF THE

GENERAL AssBMBLY, No. A/P.V. 178 at 2-5a (Dec. 9, 1948). The

text of the Convention may also be found in DEPT. OF STATE PuB. No. 3416 (1949); 5 U .N.

BUL. 1012 (1948); 35 A.B.A.J. 57 (1949); 58 YALE L.J. 1157 (1949).
5 See, e.g., Phillips, ''The Genocide Convention: Its Effect on Our Legal System," 35
A.B.A.J. 623-5 (1949); 35 A.B.A.J. 288, 360 (1949). See also, White, "Tomorrow One
May Be Guilty of Genocide," 12 TD:. B.J. 203 (1949) Cf. Bray and Liebhafsky, 28 MICH.
ST. BAR. J. 42 (July 1949).
o U.S. CoNsT., Art. VI, §2.
7 See note 5, supra. Cf. Kuhn, ''The Genocide Convention and States Rights," 43 AM..
J. INT. L. 498 (1949).
s See, for example, Rix, "Human Rights and International Law: Effect of the Covenant
on our Constitution," 35 A.B.A.J. 551, 554 (1949). Cf. Kunz, ''The United Nations Declaration of Human Rights," 43 AM.. J. INT. L. 316 (1949).
O Foster v. Neilson, 2 Pet. (27 U.S.) 253 at 314 (1829).
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to carry out its provisions.10 To determine whether legislative action
is necessary, the intent of the parties, reflected primarily in the terms
of the treaty, must be examined.11
The intent that there shall be legislative implementation must be
presumed where the power to deal with the subject matter of the
treaty is vested solely in, the legislature. For instance, the legislature
must execute a treaty involving an outright appropriation of money.
But no other type of ·treaty falls unmistakably within the exclusive
domain of Congress.12
Intent is also beyond dispute when a treaty expressly stipulates for
legislative implementation as a provision that the "powers agree ... to
take, or propose to their ... lawmaking bodies, the necessary measures
for insuring the execution of the present Convention."13
Outside of these areas, the cases have not been classified. A crosssectional analysis should reveal whether or not the courts have charted
a consistent course in folloyving Chief Justice Marshall's landmark
opinion.
To determine whether uniformity of interpretation exists, a sampling should be made of provisions which the courts have deemed too
clear for discussion.
Provisions of an act denying workmen's compensation benefits
to nonresident aliens violated a treaty that nationals of either party
injured within the territory of the other "shall ... enjoy the same rights
and privileges as are or may be granted to nationals" of the. other, and
under like conditions.14
Where a treaty provides that citizens of "each of the . . . Parties
lOJn general, see 5 HACKWORTH, DIGEST oP INn!RNA'nONAL LAw 177 (1943); 5
MooRE, lNTBRNA'nONAL LAW DIGEST 221 (1906); Dickinson, "Axe the Liquor Treaties SelfExecutingi'" 20 AM. J. INT. L. 444 (1926); Reiff, "The Enforcement of Multipartite Administrative Treaties in the United States," 34 AM. J. INT. L. 661 (1940).
11 See, for example, 5 HACKWORTH, DIGEST oP INn!RNA'nONAL LAW 180-183 (1943).
12 Some writers feel that Congress must implement a variety of treaties. In general, see
Anderson, ''Treaties as Domestic Law," 29 AM. J. INT. L. 472 (1935). Such contentions
have not been home out by the cases. Concerning penalties, see United States v. Schooner
Peggy, 1 Cranch (5 U.S.) 103 at 110 (1801); The Pictonian, (D.C. N.Y. 1924) 3 F. (2d)
145; Ex parte Toscano, (D.C. Cal. 1913) 208 F. 938. As to trade marks, see Bacardi Corp.
v. Domenech, 311 U.S. 150, 61 S.Ct. 219 (1940). A treaty may even affect revenue matters
and be self-executing, so long as money need not be appropriated. For example, most-favorednation clauses may overcome provisions of previous tariff acts without the need for legislative
support.
13 Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds, 39 Stat. L. 1702 (Aug. 16, 1916),
Art.
See also, Five Per Cent Cases, 6 Cust. App. 291 at 328-331 (1915), reversed on
other grounds, 243 U.S. 97, 37 S.Ct. 346 (1917).
14 Antosz v. State Compensation Commissioner, 130 W.Va. 260, 43 S.E. (2d) 397
(1947); see also Vietti v. Mackie Fuel Co., 109 Kan. 179, 197 P. 881 (1921).
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shall have liberty to ... reside in the territories of the other to carry
on trade,"15 it was considered self-executing without question.
The self-executing character of a Convention was unchallenged
where it provided that consuls "shall enjoy in both countries all the
rights ... which are or may hereafter be granted to the officers of the
same grade, of the most favored nation."16
A provision that a national of one party inheriting realty in the
territory of the other party "shall be allowed a term of three years in
which to sell" the property1 7 was considered self-executing without
discussion.
l. Rejected tests. Before attempting to filter out common elements
present in these cases, several conclusions which may arise upon
superficial analysis of the subject may be rejected.
The nature or purpose of the treaty is not of substantial importance
in determining its self-executing character. When its purpose is easily
fulfilled, a treaty would tend to be self-executing more frequently than
if the machinery for execution were complex. Thus, the unconditional
most-favored-nation clause, exemplified by the first two types of treaties
discussed, is typically self-executing.18 But treaties are not susceptible
of classification on the basis of their inherent nature or purpose apart
from the limited area in which Congress alone can act. When mostfavored-nation clauses were conditional in form, for example, the execution of the condition was frequently left to the legislature.19 Even a
treaty of cession could require legislation, expressly or by implication. 20
Therefore, the particular objective for which a treaty is created does
not ordinarily limit the freedom of the framers in determining its
domestic effect.
The presence of language of futurity will not deter the courts from
giving immediate effect to a treaty. The language of all the provisions
sampled is cast in the future tense. 21
Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 44 S.Ct. 634 (1924).
v. Egan, 284 U.S. 30, 52 S.Ct. 81 (1931). See also Dainese v. Hale,
91 U.S. 13, 23 L. Ed. 190 (1875).
11 Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 67 S.Ct. 1431 (1947).
1s See, for example, Bill Co. v. United States, (Cust. & Pat. App. 1939) 104 F. (2d)
67 at 70-71. See in general, 5 HACKWORTH, DIGEST oF hrrERNATIONAL LAw 180-183 (1943).
10 See, in general, REPORT BY WICXBRSHAM To LEAGUE ComFICATION CoMMITrEB,
LIN pub. C. 205, M.79, 1927 V [1927 v. 10], 22 AM. J. INT. L. SPEC. SUPP. 134 (1928).
20 See, for example, Foster v. Neilson, 2 Pet. (27 U.S.) 253 (1829). Ordinarily, a treaty
for the cession of territory does not require legislative assistance, and traditional interpretation
is of some importance. De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 at 195, 21 S.Ct. 743 (1900).
21 See also, United States v. 43 Gallons of Whiskey, 93 U.S. 188 at 196, 23 L. Ed. 846
(1876); Bill Co. v. United States, (Cust. & Pat. App. 1939) 104 F. (2d) 67.
11,

16 Santovincenzo
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2. Common factors. Two common factors appear which may indicate the formula used by the courts.
The operative language of the sample treaties provides for future
protection under the terms of the instrument itself or by some machinery
incorporated into the treaty. Furthermore, individual rights are protected in all these instances.
. Alternatively, a broader test is suggested by the foregoing provisions
and by the opinion of Chief Justice Marshall. The future action de;rnanded by the terms of the treaties need not be performed by the
legislature.
Two cases in particular highlight these two common factors.
In the Robertson case,22 a provision that rights of priority as to
patents "shall be extended by each of the ... parties" was denied automatic operation. The protection given individuals by this provision
had to await the will of the legislature. Also, further cases show that
the test of future protection is too narrow. A provision that "a neutral
power which receives ... troops belonging to ... belligerent armies
shall intern them ... at a distance from the theater of war" is penal in
nature, rather than protective.23 Yet, it was considered self-executing.
This provision also indicates that individual interests are not always at
stake in self-executing treaties. Such a treaty may concern national
interests as well. 24
Does the futurity of legislative action test separate the cases? In
the Bacardi case,25 the court found self-executing a provision that trade
marks "shall be admitted to registration ... and legally protected in the
other ... States upon compliance with the formal provisions of the
domestic law of such States." Individual rights are protected; but unlike the Robertson case, 26 future legislative action is not necessary.
Only individual action is required in complying with the formal prerequisites of domestic law.
3. Present action. When a treaty is capable of immediate application, it is self-executing. Use of the present tense furnishes clear evi22 Robertson v. General Electric Co., (C.C.A. 4th, 1929) 32 F. (2d) 495. The circuit
court of appeals reversed, General Electric Co. v. Robertson, (D.C. Md. 1928) 25 F. (2d)
146.
23 Ex parte Toscano, (D.C. Cal. 191?) 208 F. 938. See also, United States v. Schooner
Peggy, 1 Cranch (5 U.S.) 103 at ll0 (1801). The Pictonian, (D.C. N.Y. 1924) 3 F. (2d)
145; Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 53 S.Ct. 305 (1933); United States v. Kearny, 2
Extraterritorial Case, (U.S. Ct. for China) 665 at 669-671 (1923).
24 See also, Head Money Cases (Edye v. Robertson; Cunard S.S. Co. v. Robertson), 112
U.S. 580 (1884).
25 Bacardi Corp. v. Domenech, 311 U.S. 150 at 158, 61 S.Ct. 219 (1940).
26 Robertson v. General Electric Co., (C.C.A. 4th, 1929) 32 F. (2d) 495.
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dence of intent to make the treaty automatically operative. For example, a provision that consuls "are authorized to require the assistance
of local authorities for the ... arrest . . . of ... deserters ..." was selfexecuting. 27 Even though a provision is cast in apparently future form,
the framers of the treaty may contemplate present effectiveness. Thus
a provision that grants of land "shall remain ratified and confirmed"28
requires no supporting legislation and is self-executing.
4. Summary. The courts appear to follow the test frequently
announced, that a treaty is self-executing if it is intended to operate
as domestic law without enabling legislation. The most evasive part
of this formula used by the courts is the determination of the draftsman's intent. To aid in ascertaining intent, the following classification of treaty provisions is suggested.
Legislative action is clearly demanded where the subject matter of
the treaty falls into a category over which Congress has exclusive
power or where the treaty calls for legislative implementation by its
own terms. Legislation is unnecessary where the terms of the treaty
clearly call for immediate operation. A treaty may be self-executing,
although it is to become effective at a future date, so long as future
action by the legislature is not required in order that the treaty operate
as domestic law. Besides the terms of the provision, traditional treatment,29 the expression of executive or legislative views,30 preparatory
work, 31 other provisions of the same treaty, and in some instances, the
use of the future tense, 32 may aid in determining the intent of the
parties.
2 7 Tucker v. Alexandroff, 183 U.S. 424 at 429, 22 S.Ct. 195 (1901).
2 8 For example, when the Spanish text of the treaty which was denied

immediate effect
in Foster v. Neilson, [2 Pet. (27 U.S.) 253 (1829)] was brought to the attention of the
Supreme Court in a later case, the Court speaking again through Chief Justice Marshall
decided that the treaty, construed in the light of the Spanish as well as the English text, was
self-executing. United States v. Percheman, 7 Pet. (32 U.S.) 51 (1833). See also, United
States v. Arredando, 6 Pet. (31 U.S.) 691 (1832); United States v. Garrow, (Cust. & Pat.
App. 1937) (No. 4018) T.D. 48208; 24 Cust. & Pat. App. 410, 88 F. (2d) 318; Garcia v.
Lee, 12 Pet. (37 U.S.) 511 (1838); United States v. Schooner Peggy, 1 Cranch (5 U.S.)
103 at 110 (1801).
29 Traditional interpretation of a type of treaty may exert some inHuence on the courts.
Treaties dealing with patents have never been found self-executing. See, for example, Robertson v. General Electric Co., (C.C.A. 4th, 1929) 32 F. (2d) 495. See also De Lima v.
Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 at 195, 21 S.Ct. 743 (1900).
30 For an example of executive view and practice, see Petition of Georgakopoulos, (D.C.
Pa. 1948) 81 F. Supp. 411; 5 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OP INTERNATIONAL LA.w 180-184 (1943).
312 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1482-1483 (1945).
32 Courts sometimes speak of language of futurity as a factor, Robertson v. General
Electric Co., (C.C.A. 4th, 1929) 32 F. (2d) 495. But if the treaty is to operate only at a
future date, the use of the future tense is necessary and is not indicative of intent that the
treaty require legislation.
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B. The Convention
1. In general. Although treaties aimed at the elimination of international crimes may require legislation to establish penalties and methods of enforcement, a need for supplementation is not absolute. 33
Therefore, the Convention must be construed to test the major premise
of its opponents that the treaty is self-executing.
Substantive provisions begin by defining the crime of genocide and
the scope of the Convention.34 The heart of the Convention, Article
V,35 is withdrawn from the realm of self-execution by express stipulation. In order to determine whether this stipulation permeates the
entire treaty, the structure of the Convention must be further examined.
2. International enforcement. Provisions to enforce the international law liability which results whenever a state breaches its treaty
obligations act only upon nations. 36 They cannot reach within the
borders of a state to operate as its internal law.37
3. Domestic enforcement. Enforcement on the domestic level is
also contemplated.
a. Article V clearly demands legislative implementation by its own
terms.
b. Article VI provides that "persons charged with genocide ...
shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the state in the territory of
33 The United States is frequently a party to agreements for the prevention of international crimes. In addition to extradition treaties, see, for example, treaties entered into for
the suppression of obscene publications, U.S. TREATY SER. No. 559 (Dept. of State 1911);
for the elimination of white slave traffic, U.S. TREATY SER. No. 496 (Dept. of State 1904);
and for the control of opium trade, U.S. TREATY SER. No. 612 (Dept. of State 1913).
84 CoNVENTION ON THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OP THE CRIME OP GENOCIDE,
Articles II-IV. See, in general, "Genocide: A Commentary on the Convention," 58 YALE L. J.
1142 (1949).
35 "The contracting parties undertake to enact, in accordance with their respective constitutions, the necessary legislation to give effect to the provisions of the present convention,
and in particular, to provide effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide••••" CoNVENTION ON THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OP GENOCIDE, Article V.
86 Contracting parties may call upon "organs of the United Nations to take such action
under the charter of the United Nations as they consider appropriate for the prevention and
suppression of acts of genocide...•" CoNVENTION ON THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OP
THE CRIME OP GENOCIDE, Article VIII.
"Disputes between contracting parties relating to the interpretation, application, or fulfillment of the present convention, including those relating to the responsibility of a state
for genocide, ••.• shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice at the request of
any of the parties to the dispute." CoNVENTION ON THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OP
THE CRIME oP GENOCIDE, Article IX.
87 Only states could initiate action under these provisions. See EcoNOMIC AND SOCIAL
CoaNCIL, Doc. No. E/ 623 at 627 (Jan. 30, 1948). In any event, the sanctions provided can
only be used against states. See "Genocide: A Commentary on the Convention," 58 YALE
L.J. 1142 at 1148 (1949).
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which the act was committed, or by such international penal tribunal
as may have jurisdiction with respect to such contracting parties as
shall have accepted the jurisdiction...." 38 Machinery for trying such
cases in our state or federal courts would appear to exist; of course,
the usual procedural safeguards of our Constitution would apply. 39
In any event, legislative action making genocide a domestic crime is
required by Article V before trial could take place. Since this key provision must await the will of the legislature, dependent provisions take
on like color.
c. Under Article VII, the contracting parties pledge themselves "to
grant extradition in accordance with their laws and treaties in force" 40
when genocide is committed. Ordinarily, extradition is not granted
unless the offense is listed as an extraditable crime. Article VII may
have the effect of adding genocide to the group of offenses for which
extradition may be granted, obviating the need for formal inclusion
by the legislature. Extradition is granted because of the violation of
laws of another country, without reference to the requirement of Article V that each country pass legislation making genocide a crime within
its own jurisdiction.41 But even if the provision for extradition is automatically operative, the United States would be obliged to return
offenders to the territory in which genocide was committed only where
an extradition treaty was in existence.42

C. Conclusion
The opponents of the Convention seem to have misconceived the
factors which make a treaty self-executing. Only a narrow segment
of the Genocide Convention may be self-executing. Assuming that the
treaty were automatically effective, the United States would not neces88 CoNVENnoN ON THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OI' THE CRIMB OI' GENOCIDE,
Article VI.
89 No international penal tribunal has been created. Such a tribunal could not grow out
of this Convention without the consent of each party. Article of Raphael Lemkin in 95 CoNc.
RBc. APP. A 1270, A 1271 (Mar. 3, 1949); Dept. of State Pub. 3643 at p. 69, I.O.C.S. ill,
39 (1949).
40 CoNVENnON ON THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OI' THE CRIMB OI' GENOCIDE,
Article VII.
41 A self-executing construction may fail if sufficient weight is given the preparatory
work of the Convention. The United States representative on the Legal Committee said,
"Until the Congress of the United States shall have enacted the necessary legislation to implement the convention, it will not be possible .•• to surrender a person accused of a crime not
already extraditable under existing laws." See Dept. of State Pub. 3643 at p. 69, I.O.C.S.
ill, 39 (1949).
42 The United States refuses to surrender criminals of another country in the absence of
treaty, Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270 at 289, 22 S.Ct. 484 (1902).
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sarily be placed at a comparative disadvantage since the domestic force
given to treaties in many nations equals our own, even though no
constitutional commandment exists.43
Even if the treaty were immediately operative as domestic law, and
such a result were peculiar to the United States, no serious handicap
would appear to result. 44 To be persuasive, criticism of the Convention
must be marshalled on more solid ground.

William C. Gordon, S.Ed.

43 See MASTERS, INTERNATIONAL LAw IN NATIONAL CouRTS (1932); BRIGGS, LAW OF
NATIONS 432-436 (1938).
44 If the United States ratifies the Convention, application of pertinent provisions would
not seem undesirable.

